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Abstract 
 
Academics and policy makers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning 
the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma 
between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other 
reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence 
of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to 
be eroded over time. In this paper we compare the relative merits of public and 
private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by 
ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery 
within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the 
public-private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Our 
results suggest that private firms tendering the service have higher delivery 
costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs 
are taken into account. Tenders, therefore, do not help to reduce delivery 
costs. Our results suggest that under a mixed delivery scheme, which permits 
the co-existence of public and private production, the metropolitan 
government and the regulator can use private delivery to contain costs in the 
public firm and, at the same time, benefit from the greater flexibility of private 
firms for dealing with events not provided for under contract. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Local governments in many developed countries have introduced competition and private delivery 
in the production of their public services, including local transportation provision. This has given 
rise to much discussion among both policy makers and scholars as they examine the relative 
merits of pure public and pure private forms of delivery. In this debate, a growing body of 
evidence seems casts doubts on the existence of systematic and sustainable cost savings over time 
attributable to privatization (Bel and Warner, 2008; Bel et al., 2010), owing primarily to 
competition failure and the high transaction costs incurred when contracting out. 
The role of the spatial dimension of competition in the provision of local public services was first 
taken into consideration in the seminal studies of Warner and Hefetz (2002, 2003), who show that 
different geographical areas (e.g., rural vs. urban) are characterized by differences in the 
respective availability of private vendors and so offer dissimilar prospects for competition. Indeed, 
the geographical area seems to be a critical determinant of the level of market competition. Bel 
and Fageda (2011), for example, report that the number of firms bidding for contracts in smaller 
cities is lower than that in larger cities. In the same vein, Girth et al. (2012) find a positive 
correlation between the choice of delivery form and the level of competition in metro core areas. 
They also obtain interesting qualitative results on the dynamics of government “relational 
contracting”: regulators tend to devote more time and resources in building and sustaining 
competition and so a low level of competition tends to add to transaction costs.  
Transaction costs are a key issue in the debate concerning potential cost savings from 
privatization, and have become a regular focus in the literature on public service privatization 
since the seminal studies of Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) and Williamson (1991, 1999). 
Contracting procedures are costly, as are the monitoring and supervision of contracted services. 
Brown and Potoski (2003, 2005) show that transaction costs have a marked influence on the 
privatization of local services, and identify the importance of two dimensions related to 
transaction costs: asset specificity and ease of measurement. Contracting agencies may 
underestimate the costs of the overall process as transaction costs are often excluded from the 
analysis. The role of transaction costs has also been examined in studies of the contracting out of 
transportation services (Croissant et al., 2013). However, to date, transaction costs have received 
very little attention in the empirical analysis of the advantages of competitive tendering as the 
main alternative to deregulated regimes (Van de Velde and Beck, 2011).   
Owing to a lack of systematic cost savings from privatization, scholarly analyses have shown a 
growing interest in alternative forms of service delivery that break with the traditional dichotomy 
between pure public and pure private production (Bel et al.,  2014). Among these alternative 
production forms, the mixed delivery of public services is particularly interesting. In a mixed 
delivery system, pure public and pure private firms provide a service within one local 
jurisdiction,1 and regulators can compare the firms’ respective production processes and costs, 
while retaining direct involvement in service delivery (Miranda and Lerner 1995). Mixed delivery 
allows a government to divide its jurisdiction in several areas, with pure public delivery being 
used in one or more areas and pure private production in other district(s) within the same 
jurisdiction (Warner and Bel, 2008). Miranda and Lerner (1995) claim that this ‘redundancy’ or 
duplication in delivery methods may in fact be efficient, as a form of benchmarking with the 
                                                            
1 Note mixed delivery differs from a mixed firm. In the latter case, the government and private partners 
share ownership of a firm, which is typically granted the monopolistic provision of services in the local 
jurisdiction. See Cruz et al. (2014) for a recent review of local mixed firms. 
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private sector, and as a means of promoting bureaucratic competition in house. As such, mixed 
delivery can promote competition by means of introducing competitive pressures on public firms, 
i.e., by disciplining public managers and labor unions (Hatry, 1999), and by preventing private 
firm monopolization. The rise in mixed forms of delivery reflects a continuing process of change 
and innovation at the local government level that combines the benefits of both market and public 
delivery (Warner and Hefetz, 2008; Hefetz et al., 2014): private firms are interested in profit, 
efficiency and control; the public sector is also interested in efficiency, but it is also expected to 
provide failsafe delivery and a higher level of public accountability and involvement.  
While mixed delivery is relatively frequent in local services such as solid waste, it is much more 
rare in that of local bus transit. The aim of this paper is to analyze a mixed delivery local 
transportation service, and – specifically – to compare the costs of the public and private firms 
delivering bus services within the same local jurisdiction. Additionally, we take into consideration 
the transaction costs incurred when contracting out to private firms, which allows us to refine our 
analysis of the cost comparison. In order to do so, we focus on the Barcelona Metropolitan Area 
bus system, which is a notable case among the relatively few examples of the mixed delivery of 
local transportation. The advantage of analyzing different firms within a single jurisdiction as 
opposed to studies elsewhere that draw comparisons between different cities (or even different 
countries) is that we do not need to rely on the assumption of homogeneity of regulators and 
spatial homogeneity.  
In short, this paper makes two major contributions to the literature. First, we analyze cost 
differences between public and private firms under a mixed delivery regime. Second, we include 
the regulator’s transaction costs (contracting procedures plus monitoring and supervision of 
contracted services) in the cost comparison, which allows us to refine the cost analysis for 
different types of service delivery.  
This paper is organized in five sections. First, we briefly review the empirical evidence reported to 
date on local bus cost analyses, with a particular focus on the comparison of public and private 
provisions. Second, we describe the local bus sector in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area, including 
the regulatory institutions and the firms operating within the jurisdiction. Next, we present the 
main elements in our empirical strategy: data and model. Then we report our empirical results and 
discuss their implications. Finally, we conclude. 
 
2 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DELIVERY OF LOCAL BUS SERVICES: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE  
In recent decades many countries have initiated the private delivery of bus transportation systems, 
above all in the wake of the far-reaching privatization reform in this sector implemented in the 
United Kingdom in the 1980s. Early studies of the impact of privatization have typically reported 
cost savings and greater efficiency with private delivery, for example, in the UK (Savage, 1993; 
White, 1997), New Zealand and Chile (Lee and Rivasplata, 2001), and Switzerland (Filippini and 
Prioni, 2003). Empirical analyses dedicated to urban bus systems report U-shaped average cost 
functions. In other words, as suggested earlier by Berechman (1993), economies of scale become 
constant or even revert to decreasing returns to scale as companies grow in size (Jørgensen et al., 
1997 and Matas and Raymond, 1999). This is an important outcome for the management of local 
bus systems, since it implies that in large cities the service can be fragmented between different 
firms without foregoing any of the potential benefits from economies of scale. 
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The existence of scale economies allows several concessions to be created in large cities where 
private operators compete for the market. Before the present century, no studies had been 
undertaken that controlled for such competition. Leland and Smirnova (2009) compared the 
evolution in efficiency and effectiveness of US urban bus services, taking as their reference Perry 
and Babitsky’s (1986) earlier work, and found that privately owned and managed transit systems 
were no longer more efficient and effective providers than government owned agencies. They 
identified the lack of competition between contractors and higher transaction costs as factors. 
However, both studies concluded that general-purpose governments that contract out services are 
more efficient and effective than special-purpose governments.  
The market for bus services is imperfectly contestable (Mackie et al., 1995): competitors may 
enter the market when the incumbent is inefficient, when the incumbent is efficient but weak 
enough to be replaced or simply because the incumbent is over?optimistic; incumbents, for their 
part, may deter entry by tightly controlling costs and by not leaving any profitable gaps in the 
service. Moreover, incumbents are better informed than potential entrants with regard to assets, 
quality, and demand. In their study of service measurability and asset specificity of local public 
services, Brown and Potoski (2005) examined operation and maintenance costs and ranked bus 
systems 27th out of 64 services in terms of service measurability (the lower the ranking, the easier 
it is to measure the service), and 39th out of 64 in terms of asset specificity (the lower the ranking, 
the lower the specificity). However, asset specificity might not represent such a great problem to 
the bus sector as buses are not a sunk cost (given that they can be sold on the used vehicle market) 
or, alternatively, they can be transferred to other services. Furthermore, provision by the 
government of buses and of bus depots can also help to mitigate asset specificity, thus increasing 
market contestability. All in all, Girth et al. (2012) classify bus systems as lying somewhere 
between monopoly and low competition services.  
The most common means of introducing competition in the provision of urban bus services is 
through competitive tendering2. The evidence provided by stochastic frontier studies in favor of 
private sector delivery should be weighed against the fact that almost none of these studies 
controls for the degree of competition and the nature of government (De Borger et al., 2002). Roy 
and Yvrande-Billon (2007) find that private operators selected through competitive tendering are 
more efficient than public operators, but they do not measure the impact of the contests. Using a 
stochastic production frontier for 135 urban transport networks, they find only marginal gains on 
technical efficiency from regulatory changes that involve a shift to delegated management and 
high-powered incentive regulatory contracts. A trans-European study finds that public firms are 
less productive than private ones, and firms selected through competitive tendering are more 
productive (Boitani et al., 2013). However, the most telling result is that during the second round 
in the tendering process (some years after the first), an increase in the gross cost is found in most 
countries. Not only are there no cost savings, but there is also some deterioration in the quality of 
the service provided, especially when the incumbent is replaced by a new entrant (Mouwen and 
Rietveld, 2013).  
Falls in the number of bidders and in bus market concentration have been described in Sweden 
(Alexandersson et al., 1998), France (Yvrande-Billon, 2006) and Norway (Mathisen and Solvoll, 
2008), among others. This situation is paralleled in Italy, where moreover the incumbent operator 
                                                            
2 Here, several studies have focused solely on regional services or on mixed urban/regional services (see, 
for example, Fazioli et al., 1994, Ottoz et al., 2009 and Cambini et al., 2011) and are not directly applicable 
to our study. 
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tends to win the majority of tender processes (Boitani and Cambini, 2006)3. Hensher and Wallis 
(2005) express a concern that tendering is open to regulatory capture by powerful monopolist bus 
providers. It is clear that the relationship between buyer and vendor evolves over time, and that the 
dependence of one party on the other grows. Local governments tend to place greater trust in the 
faithfulness and honesty of their vendors when the latter party has a known reputation from prior 
to the relationship, strong community ties, and performs its tasks well (Lamothe and Lamothe, 
2012). Thus, welfare gains from extending contract length can be signiﬁcant but accrue mostly to 
operators (Gagnepain et al., 2014) 
Putting this relationship out to tender, in a process that attracts few bidders and involves complex 
contracts and incompleteness may not be the best solution if compared to negotiated performance-
based contracts (Hensher and Stanley, 2008). Hensher (2014) concludes that the gains from 
competitive tendering are generally illusory or overstated (outside the situation of an incumbent 
public firm):  
“While noting that many governments suggest that competitive tendering ensures 
transparency, our experience with the practice of competitive tendering does not ensure 
such a claim is necessarily valid, for often the details of tender review and assessment are 
rarely published, and claims of cost savings have been known to be fabricated.”  
The next step therefore is to consider the role that can be played by a public operator when 
compared to that of private firms in the competitive tendering vs. negotiated performance-based 
contracts debate. 
 
3. THE BARCELONA METROPOLITAN BUS SYSTEM:  REGULATORS AND 
OPERATING COMPANIES 
The provision of public transport in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area has remained largely stable 
over recent decades. Local bus transit in the metropolitan area is provided under a mixed delivery 
system, in which one public and several private firms supply the service in different areas under 
the supervision of a regulator.   
The Entitat Metropolitana del Transport (EMT) is the regulator, and is responsible for regulating 
local bus transit in the city of Barcelona and the towns in its metropolitan area. The EMT defines 
the characteristics of the service offered by the concessionaires, establishes network routes, draws 
up bus schedules, defines quality levels, organizes the tenders, and covers the deficits run up by 
the private firms4 (Albalate et al., 2012). EMT has considerable experience as a management 
contractor and has been tendering services since the 1990s. Private companies can operate services 
by means of competitive tendering contracts (net-cost contracts) or negotiated performance-based 
contracts (gross-cost contracts), both with quality incentives. The EMT is the owner of bus fleets 
and bus depots, and provides vehicles and facilities to the operating companies.  
The publicly owned firm Transports Metropolitans de Barcelona (TMB) operates 106 lines, and 
in 2012 it carried around 174 million passengers. The number of passengers has remained stable 
                                                            
3 In Germany there is an incumbent renewal rate of 74% and an average of more than five bidders per 
tender (Beck and Walter, 2013). 
4 Another public agency, Autoritat Metropolitana del Transport (ATM) is responsible for setting fares for 
all transport modes. Since 2001 an integrated fare policy exists for all public transport supply (including 
buses) with the exception of the airport shuttle bus and the city tour bus. 
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since 1980, as several lines formerly operated by TMB have been privatized, and the metropolitan 
subway network has also been expanded.  Correspondingly, supply has also remained quite stable: 
TMB offered 3,182 million seats-km in 2012, just a little above the 3,050 million seats-km 
supplied on 1989. TMB has not participated in any tender process in the Barcelona Metropolitan 
Area. However, in 2011 a joint venture group formed by TMB and Vectalia (a private group based 
in Valencia) was awarded the provision of public transport in the Perpignan Méditerranée 
Metropolitan Area (France). TMB enjoys freedom to design and plan its own services, and is not 
subject to a concession contract with the EMT. As such, TMB can be described as a corporatized 
company, enjoying greater managerial flexibility than that typically enjoyed by a traditional 
bureaucratic organization.  
Several of the private concessions overlap with the TMB delivery area as both connect Barcelona 
(including downtown) with the surrounding municipalities and operate in the surrounding 
municipalities. The difference is that only TMB operates the intra-city routes. Bus services 
operated by private firms under competitive contracts represent 81% of the EMT’s total 
passengers (excluding TMB).5 Private concessionaires operate under net-cost contracts, with 
vehicle and depot facilities being supplied by the EMT. Tender concessions follow a net-cost 
contract scheme or a minimum subsidy: firms receive a subsidy from the EMT that is equal to the 
difference between the expected revenues from passengers and the bidding cost. Private operators 
enjoy far less managerial autonomy than TMB. The average concession length is five years, with 
the possibility of an extension (average length of extensions is three years). 
The first tendering process took place in 1998, and Table 1 shows all the tendering processes 
implemented up to and including 2012, and which are considered in our analysis.6 The number of 
firms bidding to obtain a concession has varied from between two and five, but the incumbent firm 
has yet to be removed by a new entrant (even in the first process). In seven of the eight tenders, 
the incumbent did not offer the lowest price (required subsidy). This only ever occurred in 2008 in 
the case of the west concession awarded to Soler i Sauret. The weight of the financial proposal 
represents between 25 and 30% of the total valuation of the bid. Greater weighting is attached to 
characteristics of the bids other than the financial proposal (required subsidy), including 
experience in the sector, expected ridership, or staff and equipment used. As a result, incumbents 
almost always obtain higher valuations in the non-financial aspects of the bid, which allows them 
to retain the contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 Our analysis focuses on net-cost contracts as gross-cost contracts are subject to a different fares policy, 
and more especially because data are scarce with firms not being required to report data to the regulator. 
Additionally, most lines operated under gross-cost contracts lie some distance from the city of Barcelona. 
The airport route, under competitive tendering, has been excluded for the same reason. 
6 A more recent tender took place in 2013, but it is not included here, as the new contract did not come into 
operation until January 2014. However, the incumbent retained the service.  
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Table 1: Bus concessions in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area 
 Concession area Winner (Group) 
Tender 
date 
Number 
of bidders 
Winner 
lowest 
price? 
Competitive 
tendering 
Barcelonès 
Nord 
Tusgsal 1998 4 No 
Tusgsal 2010 2 No 
Barcelonès 
Nord (Night) 
Tusgsal 1998 4 No 
Tusgsal 2006 3 No 
Hospitalet de 
Llobregat 
Rosanbus (Baixbus) 2001 5 No 
Rosanbus (Baixbus) 2011 5 No 
West 
Barcelona 
Soler Sauret 1998 4 No 
Soler Sauret 2008 3 Yes 
Negotiated 
performance-
based 
contracts 
U1 Mohn (Baixbus) 
 
U2 Oliveras (Baixbus) 
Barcelona 
South Coast Mohn (Baixbus) 
West 
Barcelona 
(Night) 
Mohn (Baixbus) 
 Source: Based on documentation from the tendering processes. 
The majority of private firms offering services operate according to the concession awarded in the 
corresponding tendering process. A small number of firms concentrate the market for tendered 
services, even though there were several bidders in the contests. It is worth noting that no 
“outsiders” (that is to say, firms or groups based outside the Barcelona Metropolitan Area) has 
ever won a tender, even when requesting the lowest subsidy (lowest contract price). This points to 
the existence of relational considerations and/or rent-seeking costs, that is, the regulator has 
incentives to avoid changing the firm because the day-to-day relationship would change. For 
example, unexpected changes not provided for in the contract might be harder to implement. A 
further possibility is that the regulator expects the incumbent to provide a higher quality service 
and thus prefers to maintain the contractual partner.  
The Catalan external auditor has analyzed three concession areas: the Barcelonès Nord day and 
night concessions and L’Hospitalet de Llobregat. The Barcelonès Nord day concession was 
modified various times between 1999 and 2006: 32 modifications involved lines and schedules, 
four involved general contract clauses, and two operational cost clauses, among others. In 1999, 
Tusgsal operated 17 lines in this zone and covered 6.6 million annual vehicle-kilometers. By 2008, 
the number of lines had risen to 30, and the company covered 10.1 million annual vehicle-
kilometers. The net yearly hours increased by 80% in this concession period. The Barcelonès Nord 
night concession experienced an increase of 36.4% in its expected annual vehicle-kilometers. The 
contest was controversial, not only because several entrants were disqualified and economic 
proposals were changed by the regulator, but also because the public firm TMB was not allowed 
to bid, as officials from this public company were also members of the regulator. Finally, in the 
case of the L’Hospitalet de Llobregat concession, the contract was modified several times between 
2002 and 2008: 16 modifications involved lines and schedules and one involved operational cost 
clauses, among others. In 2002, Rosanbus operated seven lines in this zone and covered 2.2 
million annual vehicle-kilometers. By 2008, the number of lines had increased to ten, and the 
annual vehicle-kilometers had increased to 2.9 million. Table 1 also includes the negotiated 
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performance based-contracts. All these contracts are held by the same metropolitan based 
firms/group.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution in cost per kilometer over time, for several concessions under tender. 
A dot on the line indicates the year in which the tender process took place (the new contract 
coming into force the following year). An initial inspection of the data shows that no cost 
reductions occurred in the years immediately following the bidding processes in the Barcelona 
Metropolitan Area.  
 
Figure 1 Temporal evolution in the cost per km by concession zone and year of tender  
  
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
a.  Data 
The data set is an unbalanced panel for the period 2002-2012, comprising 378 observations and 
four companies, one of them fully publicly-owned (TMB) and the other three completely private. 
The data are provided by the public bus company (TMB) and the regulator (EMT), the latter 
providing data for the private firms. The year 2002 is the first year after the integrated fare policy 
was introduced. 
We choose private bus lines that connect Barcelona with neighboring towns and urban lines in 
surrounding towns in areas under concession. We exclude lines that run parallel to motorways or 
high capacity roads, since the characteristics of these lines are not similar to those operated by the 
public company TMB. We choose all TMB lines that connect Barcelona with neighboring towns, 
as well as lines within the municipality of Barcelona but at some distance from downtown 
Barcelona. We exclude all night routes because they differ markedly from day routes in terms of 
wages, average speed, network length, etc.  
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Figure 2 shows our study area. The municipalities are represented by polygons, the largest of 
which is Barcelona, with a length of 9 km and a width of 8 km. The solid lines represent public 
bus routes and the broken lines represent those operated by private concessionaires. The three 
private companies operate in three different geographical areas: the northern area is operated by 
Tusgsal, the western by Soler i Sauret, and the southern by Rosanbus. It is worth noting that the 
various lines overlap, and even though the concession areas are different, they are sufficiently 
similar to be compared. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the concessionaire firms included in the analysis. The 
available information includes – for each concession – the number of lines analyzed, the line 
length, the number of passengers carried, the number of vehicles, the number of employees, and 
the cost and revenue per net km (thus, not taking into account trips without passengers from and to 
depots; ‘per km’ hereafter), among others. The main differences between the concessionaires 
concern the number of lines analyzed, the number of passengers carried, the number of vehicles 
and the costs, total costs and the  cost per km covered. 
More than half the lines analyzed are publicly managed, while the others are distributed among the 
three private companies. Differences also occur between the public and private companies in 
terms of the  cost per km, the number of passengers carried and the number of kilometers covered. 
Given the similarity in line length, it is clear that TMB has a higher bus frequency than that 
operated by the private companies. The public company also carries more passengers. However, 
some private companies employ a larger workforce than that employed by TMB relative to the 
number of kilometers covered. A further difference is the age of the fleet: the fleet renewal rate of 
the public company is much lower than that of the main private operators. In this regard, TMB has 
its own purchasing policy, while the EMT purchases the private bus fleet. Additionally, the 
number of employees is higher and significantly different in the public company compared to the 
private firms. There are marked differences in costs: the public company is the most expensive 
firm by line, but when we compare the total costs by km covered, it is not the most expensive. The 
transaction costs for the private lines remain constant each year. However, these costs can 
represent between 3.5 and 14% of their total costs. 
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Figure 2. Public and private bus lines in our study area 
 
 
Table 2: Mean (standard error) based on 378 bus line observations (2002-2012) 
 
 Concessionaires 
 TMB Barcelonès Nord (Tusgsal) 
Hospitalet de 
Llobregat (Rosanbus) 
West Barcelona 
(Soler Sauret) 
Average speed (km/h) 12.91 (0.147) 10.72 (0.203) 12.604 (0.307) 12.58 (0.408) 
Length line (km) 10.454 (0.223) 8.576 (0.496) 11.396 (0.82) 10.308 (0.364) 
Net km (km) 430,924 (13337.5) 293,336 (20,762.6) 306,643 (19,145.1) 123,505(10,751.1) 
Vehicles 10.96 (0.343) 5.48 (0.399) 6.155 (0.392) 2.63 (0.176) 
Bus age (years) 6.49 (0.04) 4.47 (0.05) 5.02 (0.09) 6.23 (0.29) 
Employees 32.0 (1.05) 27.02 (1.46) 16.59 (1.28) 6.25 (0.5) 
Passengers 1,569,978 (69639) 883,722 (61,527) 1,129,646 (121,391) 176,540 (20,299) 
Cost per net km 4.10 (0.059) 5.13 (0.116) 3.85 (0.131) 3.33 (0.183) 
Revenues per net km 1.62 (0.04) 1.47 (0.06) 1.55 (0.13) 0.59 (0.04) 
Total costs (€) 1,784,709 (62,653) 1,391,206 (78,470) 1,073,187 (76,330) 379,854.4 (44,492) 
Transaction costs (€) 0 52,217.17 (971.9) 51,435.91 (1389.95) 51,172.17 (2556.0) 
Analyzed lines 21 9.4 5.4 1.6 
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b. The model 
A firm converts inputs into output. Thus, a bus company uses employees as labor force, fuel and 
other materials to obtain energy, and rolling stock as capital. The purpose is to cover kilometers 
and transport passengers, assuming total costs to be a function of input and output prices. When 
data are comparable and consistent over time, the most functional form found in the literature is a 
translog cost function (Coelli, 2003). The translog cost function, initially proposed by Viton 
(1981), considers cost as a function of input prices and the production level. We use an 
approximation of the translog cost function as used previously by Matas and Raymond (1998), 
Fraquelli et al. (2004), and Ottoz et al. (2009). This flexible functional form is a second-order 
logarithmic approximation to any arbitrary twice-differentiable cost function. We assume that 
input prices and output are exogenous. We assume that the cost function is the result of cost 
minimization given input prices and output. Therefore, it should satisfy concavity in input prices 
and monotonicity in input prices and output. Based on the literature, we specify the following cost 
function: 
 
   ???? ? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ????     
 
where the total cost of an urban bus firm TC is assumed to be a function of output Y, factor prices 
P (labor L, material and energy M, and capital C) and the network N (length line and commercial 
average speed). As a result, the cost function equation to be estimated can be expressed in the 
following double log form: 
 
?? ???? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??? ?? ???? ??
?
?
??????????? ?
?
?
??????????? ?
?
?
??????? ?????? ?
?????????????? ? ????????? ?? ???? ? ????????? ?? ???? ? ??? ?? ???? ? ??? ?? ???? ?
?
?
???????? ?????? ??
?
?
???????? ?????? ? ????????? ?? ???? ? ????????? ?? ???? ? ????????? ?? ???? ?
????????? ?? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ? ????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ? ????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ?
???????????????? ? ???????????? ??????????????? ? ??????????????? ? ??????????? ?
?????????????????? ? ??? ? ???  
  
  
with ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ???????????????????? ? ????? ?????? ? ????? 
 
where subscripts i and t denote the line and year respectively. Linear homogeneity in input prices 
is imposed by dividing total costs and input prices by material and energy price. ??? follows a 
truncated normal distribution? ???? ???. To begin with, we use a specification in which the error 
term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and is assumed to be constant over time 
(? ? ???.
7 
 
??? ? ???????? ? ??????                                                        (3) 
                                                            
7 The other specification involves considering time-variation inefficiency, as described by Battese and 
Coelli (1995), where ? is the decay parameter.  
(1) 
(2) 
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The actors affected by transaction costs are the private firms and the regulator. Private companies 
need to devote some of their time to preparing their tender bid and to relating with the regulator if 
they win the contest. The regulator needs to organize the tender process and monitor the private 
winner during the period of concession. However, most of the regulator’s budget is paid for by the 
taxpayers, and there is no specific transfer of the regulator’s cost to the private firm’s services. 
While some earlier studies take into account the intra-firm administration costs, our paper is the 
first – to the best of our knowledge – to consider the regulator’s transaction costs. Thus, allocating 
regulator costs equally to all private lines allows us to undertake a more refined and robust cost 
comparison.8  
 
c. Variables 
The cost function includes three inputs, one output and several other variables.  
 
TC: The total cost is the dependent variable, and includes labor, fuel, maintenance, bus fleet, and 
other indirect costs (such as administration and coordination costs at the firm level, both for public 
and private firms). We evaluate these costs in two different scenarios, depending on whether we 
include transaction costs, or not. The transaction cost is the regulator’s total budget, and we 
distribute it equally between each private line.   
 
Y: The output variable is vehicle·kilometers, a supply-related measure. Seat-kilometers would have 
been another suitable measure, but we have no data here for private companies.9 The three inputs 
and output are expected to have a positive sign.  
 
N: Line length is a network characteristic that influences total costs. This variable can serve as a 
proxy for exogenous characteristics such as public service obligations. Expectations regarding the 
effects of line length on costs are ambiguous. On the one hand, longer lines involve more output, 
and hence higher costs; on the other, longer lines probably operate more frequently outside of the 
downtown area, and hence are associated with higher speeds. 
 
SP: Network average speed is a typical indicator. If a trip is covered in a shorter time, fewer 
vehicles and less labor force are required. Therefore, costs are expected to decrease with 
increasing network speed. 
 
PL: The price of labor is given by the ratio of total salary expenses to the total number of hours 
worked. Costs should increase with the price of labor. 
 
PM: The price of material is obtained by dividing fuel and maintenance material costs by net 
kilometers covered. Costs should increase with the price of materials. 
 
PC: The price of capital is given by the ratio of vehicle costs to the number of vehicles. The cost 
is expected to increase with the price of capital. 
 
                                                            
8 Recall that EMT’s costs are not allocated to TMB lines, because the EMT does not regulate TMB and 
does not undertake any other functional activity with respect to TMB. 
9 We choose a supply-related measure as opposed to a demand-related indicator (such as the number of 
passengers or passenger-km) as supply-related measures vary with inputs.  
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Tender Year: This dummy variable takes a value of 1 for the year immediately following a tender 
process held (that is, the year in which the new concession terms are applied). The new contracts 
come into force on January 1, even though the contest has been celebrated in the previous year. If 
tenders were cost-minimizing artifacts, costs should decrease following a tender process. 
 
Private: This binary variable takes a value of 1 if the line is operated by a private company, and 0 
if it is operated by the public company TMB. Most empirical evidence for bus services indicates 
that private companies incur lower costs, but this evidence is not systematic across other local 
service sectors, such as solid waste and water. 
 
Concession dummies: A dummy that clusters the same concession’s bus lines up to a total of four.  
 
Time dummies: Time dummies seek to capture the temporal effects of each year on all lines. 
 
Barcelona (BCN): This dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the whole bus line is within the 
municipality of Barcelona, and 0 otherwise. In this way we control for the effect of the city of 
Barcelona on the cost function. 
 
Municipality (MUN): This dummy takes a value of 1 if the bus route is within the same 
municipality (but outside Barcelona), and 0 otherwise. 
 
Metro (MET): This dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the bus line is affected by the new 
metropolitan subway lines opened in 2010, and 0 otherwise.  
 
RESULTS 
We estimate the model by applying OLS to equation 2 (Table 3). For concession dummies we take 
as our reference TMB. Since all variables are expressed in logarithms (with the exception of the 
dummy variables), the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The original values of the 
monetary variables are deflated by a price index. The explanatory capacity of the estimations is 
high (γ ranges between 0.87 and 0.99). 
 
Half of the specifications are estimated with the dependent variable (total cost) without including 
the transaction costs (left-hand columns), while the other half include the transaction costs (right-
hand columns). Overall no significant differences were found when using either one or other of 
the alternative specifications for the dependent variable, with the exception of the costs of private 
companies, to which we return later. 
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Table 3: Total-cost parameter estimates with time invariant inefficiency term (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
Significance levels: * 10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 1 per cent 
 Without transaction costs With transaction costs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
?? 
0.632*** 
(0.0922) 
0.601*** 
(0.0103) 
0.577*** 
(0.0855) 
0.460*** 
(0.0913) 
0.466*** 
(0.081) 
0.397*** 
(0.0804) 
?? 
0.189 
(0.3139) 
0.085 
(0.2795) 
0.233 
(0.281) 
-0.124 
(0.3021) 
-0.278 
(0.279) 
0.157 
(0.2762) 
??? 
-1.056** 
(0.419) 
-0.954** 
(0.3909) 
-0.885** 
(0.373) 
-1.099*** 
(0.4129) 
-0.954** 
(0.381) 
-0.824** 
(0.3724) 
??? 
0.667** 
(0.3372) 
0.502 
(0.3281) 
0.396 
(0.3205) 
0.546* 
(0.3225) 
0.613* 
(0.3143) 
0.497 
(0.3131) 
??? 
-0.471*** 
(0.10793) 
-0.448*** 
(0.1063) 
-0.432*** 
(0.107) 
-0.433*** 
(0.1026) 
-0.504*** 
(0.0883) 
-0.464*** 
(0.085) 
Tender year  0.014 (0.0102) 
0.017 
(0.0101)  
-0.004 
(0.0099) 
-0.001 
(0.0099) 
Private  0.07*** (0.0139)   
0.1283*** 
(0.0147)  
Tusgsal   0.101*** (0.0147)   
0.149*** 
(0.0143) 
Rosanbus   0.063*** (0.0148)   
0.11*** 
(0.0149) 
Soler Sauret   0.022 (0.0188)   
0.07*** 
(0.019) 
????  
0.01 
(0.0096) 
0.006 
(0.0089)  
-0.006* 
(0.0139) 
-0.02 
(0.0142) 
????  
-0.013 
(0.0099) 
0.0033 
(0.0089)  
-0.031** 
(0.0122) 
-0.003 
(0.0102) 
????  
0.013 
(0.0083) 
0.011 
(0.0082)  
0.009 
(0.0081) 
0.007 
(0.0082) 
Γ 0.873 0.9926 0.997 0.875 0.868 0.985 
Log likelihood 722.41 739.93 748.88 723.64 750.01 758.29 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 
 
 
 
In general, the main variables present the expected sign and are statistically significant. Output 
elasticity lies between 0.632 and 0.397, implying that a 1% increase in the bus vehicle-kilometers 
supplied will increase total costs by just 0.632-0.397%. Average speed is negative and always 
significant and our findings confirm that it is negatively related with the firms’ cost performance. 
Therefore, public policies oriented towards increasing bus transit speeds might be desirable, 
because passengers (and/or taxpayers) would pay less for bus transportation. By contrast, network 
length is not statistically significant in any specification.10  
In the case of input variables, we find mixed results for labor input price, which appears to be 
significant in half the estimations. Significant coefficients vary between 0.55 and 0.67, in line with 
results elsewhere in the literature. The coefficient for the price of capital is negative and highly 
                                                            
10 Ottoz et al. (2009) suggest that a possible multicollinearity problem between output and the network 
length variables affects the estimation. To check for this problem we ran the estimations again this time 
excluding the network length variable. Our results remained unchanged, above all as regards the signs of 
coefficients and their significances.  
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significant, ranging from 0.43 to 0.50. This result is contrary to expectations, but might be in line 
with the suggestion made by Levaggi (1994) with regards to the generous government programs 
for subsidizing investments. In fact, the regulator (EMT) owns the buses operated by the private 
firms, which do not minimize their costs in the long run.  
None of the geographical (Barcelona and Municipality) and intermodal (Metro) variables are 
significant. This indicates that are no differences between interurban lines and the intra-municipal 
lines. Furthermore, the new subway services do not exert any competitive pressure on the bus 
lines, probably because the routes offered do not overlap significantly. 
Our primary focus is, first and foremost, to compare the costs of public and private delivery. 
Interestingly, we do not find any cost savings with private delivery. In fact, private firms appear to 
have higher costs than the public firm, this being true for two of the three private firms when 
transaction costs are not taken into consideration. When transaction costs are included, we find 
that the firms’ total costs increase by around 5%, and all private firms have significantly higher 
costs than the public firm. 
Second, we are interested in determining the effects of competition on costs. Here, the year of 
tender year is not significant in any case. As such, our results confirm our descriptive data in the 
sense that tender processes do not reduce bus costs (Figure 1). Interestingly, for specification 3, 
we find no cost differences between the private firm Soler i Sauret and the public firm TMB. 
Recall that Soler i Sauret was the only company to be awarded a concession when tendering the 
lowest price, in 2008. This lack of effect of tenders on costs would appear to be related to the fact 
that the lowest price offered has not generally been the main factor driving the award of 
concessions.  
In Table 4 we regress the same specifications including time controls. We take as our references 
the year 2002 and TMB. We obtain very similar results (sign and significance) for all variables in 
the equation. Note that in this case, however, the price of labor is significant in all the estimations. 
The time dummies are significant and positive, there being a cost increase over time.  
In the case of the variables related to ownership, we find that Rosanbus and Soler i Sauret have 
similar costs (not including transaction costs) to those of the public firm TMB, while Tugsal 
reports higher costs. When we include the transaction costs, all the private firms’ costs are higher 
than TMB’s by between 5 and 11%. Finally, it is worth noting that our competition variable is 
slightly significant and negatively related to costs in one out of four specifications.11  
  
                                                            
11 We conducted a robustness check estimating the model with time-varying effects on the error term, 
allowing ? to differ from zero. The signs were maintained, as were approximate significances for all 
variables. Private production was found to be more expensive than public, and the year of tender was once 
more not significant. See results in Table A-1 in the Appendix. 
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 Table 4: Total-cost parameter estimates with time invariant inefficiency term and temporal effects 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Significance levels: * 10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 1 per cent 
 
 Without transaction costs With transaction costs (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
?? 
0.547*** 
(0.0748) 
0.579*** 
(0.076) 
0.533*** 
(0.073) 
0.319*** 
(0.076) 
0.423*** 
(0.0739) 
0.401*** 
(0.0716) 
?? 
0.191 
(0.2493) 
0.024 
(0.2604) 
0.185 
(0.240) 
0.42* 
(0.2538) 
-0.05 
(0.266) 
0.164 
(0.2408) 
??? 
-1.364*** 
(0.3393) 
-1.276*** 
(0.3362) 
-1.215*** 
(0.322) 
-1.448*** 
(0.3645) 
-1.00*** 
(0.3408) 
-0.923*** 
(0.3226) 
??? 
0.552* 
(0.2925) 
0.647*** 
(0.297) 
0.476* 
(0.2867) 
0.858*** 
(0.3068) 
0.537* 
(0.3001) 
0.487* 
(0.2939) 
??? 
-0.641*** 
(0.0909) 
-0.646*** 
(0.2969) 
-0.656*** 
(0.096) 
-0.715*** 
(0.0806) 
-0.588*** 
(0.0794) 
-0.607*** 
(0.0775) 
Tender year  -0.016 (0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.01)  
-0.014 
(0.0102) 
-0.015 
(0.0102) 
Private  0.006 (0.0159)   
0.083*** 
(0.0169)  
Tusgsal   0.045*** (0.016)   
0.115*** 
(0.0159) 
Rosanbus   -0.007 (0.0165)   
0.07*** 
(0.0164) 
Soler Sauret   -0.018 (0.0179)   
0.051*** 
(0.0188) 
????  
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.0077)  
-0.018 
(0.0136) 
-0.018 
(0.0122) 
????  
-0.013 
(0.0092) 
0.001 
(0.0067)  
-0.013 
(0.0116) 0.0 (0.0063) 
????  
0.0013 
(0.0083) 
-0.002 
(0.008)  
0.008 
(0.0086) 
0.004 
(0.0085) 
2003 0.023*** (0.0084) 
0.023*** 
(0.0086) 
0.024*** 
(0.0087) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
0.025*** 
(0.0087) 
0.025*** 
(0.0088) 
2004 0.032*** (0.0085) 
0.032*** 
(0.0089) 
0.033*** 
(0.0089) 
0.048*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
2005 0.038*** (0.0084) 
0.038*** 
(0.0092) 
0.038*** 
(0.0092) 
0.063*** 
(0.0089) 
0.041*** 
(0.009) 
0.04*** 
(0.0093) 
2006 0.039*** (0.0087) 
0.039*** 
(0.0098) 
0.039*** 
(0.0099) 
0.061*** 
(0.0091) 
0.034*** 
(0.0098) 
0.032*** 
(0.0099) 
2007 0.014* (0.0083) 
0.014 
(0.0089) 
0.013 
(0.089) 
0.029*** 
(0.0087) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
2008 0.016* (0.0087) 
0.017* 
(0.01) 
0.017* 
(0.0101) 
0.042*** 
(0.0091) 
0.013 
(0.0102) 
0.011 
(0.0102) 
2009 -0.011 (0.0084) 
-0.009 
(0.0089) 
-0.010 
(0.088) 
-0.003 
(0.0089) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.018** 
(0.0089) 
2010 0.024*** (0.0087) 
0.026** 
(0.0105) 
0.027*** 
(0.0104) 
0.04*** 
(0.0092) 
0.01*** 
(0.0105) 
0.011 
(0.0105) 
2011 0.041*** (0.0093) 
0.046*** 
(0.0116) 
0.047*** 
(0.0116) 
0.048*** 
(0.01) 
0.019*** 
(0.0116) 
0.019 
(0.0116) 
2012 0.073*** (0.0097) 
0.081*** 
(0.0127) 
0.084*** 
(0.0128) 
0.069*** 
(0.0102) 
0.036*** 
(0.0128) 
0.038*** 
(0.0129) 
γ 0.848 0.976 0.997 0.90 0.785 0.947 
Log likelihood 796.75 799.53 810.9 776.11 797.81 808.79 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 
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5. DISCUSSION 
We find that public delivery costs are similar to, or lower than private costs (depending on the 
firm) even when transaction costs are excluded. Thus, when we do include transaction costs 
private ownership is systematically more costly. As such, our results show the importance of 
considering transaction costs, as they reflect the costs paid by the citizens to maintain the 
regulator, and they ensure a better comparison of the total costs paid by bus users and taxpayers. 
The failure to consider transaction costs in previous empirical studies may well have biased the 
results of the cost comparisons undertaken to the detriment of public firms.  
It is worth emphasizing as well that tenders for concessions did not help to achieve lower costs. 
And only in the case of the Soler i Sauret bus company, awarded the sole concession when the 
lowest price was offered, do we find costs that are not systematically higher than those of the 
pubic firm TMB. In the case of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area, incumbents know they need not 
offer the most competitive price, as price is given comparatively little weight in the evaluations of 
tender submissions, never exceeding 35% of the total, and the regulator has considerable 
discretionary powers in relation to criteria other than price. The fact that concessions tend to be 
awarded to incumbents that do not offer the lowest price could be the result of regulatory capture, 
but it could also be a consequence of the regulator expecting higher relational costs with the 
incumbent than if a new firm were to enter the market. We do not have sufficient empirical 
information to draw a definitive conclusion. However, it is worth noting that our results are 
consistent with the conclusions presented in Albalate et al. (2011), which suggest that the EMT 
uses its bargaining power to complement formal contracts with relational contracting.12 
Our results from Barcelona show that competition between private firms is not effective and that 
private firm delivery is more costly, particularly when we take into account their transaction costs. 
Governments and regulators face different challenges. First, they have to fulfill the requirements 
of competitive tendering that emanate from higher legal frameworks promoting contests in which 
there is no common carrier providing the service. Second, they are forced to seek more flexible 
agreements to guarantee a workable relationship based on trust with the private operator. 
Competitive tendering involves greater rigidities than a negotiated contract, since it reduces 
government opportunities for modifying the delivery conditions. In the case of Barcelona, these 
rigidities are weakened somewhat by the constant changes introduced by the regulator into the 
contract. Likewise, the fact that incumbents tend not to be replaced by new entrants, and that few 
of them share the geographical market, suggests a partnership of trust exists between the regulator 
and private operators. All this seems to indicate that competitive tendering conditions are 
increasingly tending to resemble a negotiated performance-based contract. In this context, 
regulator accountability is weakened. Moreover, cost minimization does not appear to be the main 
driver introducing private delivery in the area of Barcelona. However, private production (which 
implies supply from private vendors) within Barcelona’s mixed delivery system has also been 
used as the basis for a credible threat for the privatization of some of TMB’s public lines. Indeed, 
this threat has been used in Barcelona at the time of labor conflicts within the public firm (see 
Albalate et al., 2012: 97). As such, it may have contributed to cost containment in the public firm, 
thus helping to explain its relatively good economic performance (compared to that of the private 
firms).   
                                                            
12 The Barcelona Metropolitan Area is not unique in this regard, as this type of behavior appears to be 
emerging in places where competitive tendering has gained ground (Yvrande-Billon, 2006), and where the 
regulator has acquired sufficient experience.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have evaluated the impact of firm ownership and competition on the total costs of 
a local bus transit service within a mixed delivery regime, paying particular attention to the 
presence of the transaction costs involved in private delivery. Based on an examination of the 
Barcelona metropolitan bus transit system, we have estimated a translog stochastic cost frontier in 
an attempt at shedding light on the effect of the delivery choices. The main results can be 
summarized as follows.  
First, the public firm has been found to perform better than the private operators selected via 
competitive tendering. The public company provides bus services at a lower, or similar cost, to 
that incurred by the private companies. Indeed, when we take transaction costs into account, the 
private firms’ total costs increase by around 5%, and all private firms are systematically more 
costly than the public firm. This result is a clear indication that cost comparisons that ignore 
transaction costs may well be underestimating private costs and giving a misleading picture of the 
costs associated with public and private delivery.  
Second, we find that operating under tender procedures does not imply cost savings, not only 
because the lines operated by private operators are more costly than public lines, but because the 
tender process does not affect total costs. This might be attributable to the fact that the price 
offered is given comparatively little weight in the evaluations of tender submissions (i.e., in the 
case analyzed, an average of between 30 and 35% of the total points). A further possible – and 
compatible – explanation is the existence of relational contracting due to complex contracts and 
incompleteness. The regulator might prefer to establish strong relationships based on trust with 
specific private providers because it needs to make constant changes to the contract. All in all, our 
results are consistent with growing concerns in the literature that competitive tendering loses 
effectiveness (in terms of any systematic cost savings) overtime.   
The debate concerning the reform of public service delivery has most frequently focused on the 
dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes. Our analysis suggests that mixed 
delivery (as long, that is, as the economic conditions for service fragmentation exist) creates a 
framework in which policy makers and regulators can employ different tools to pursue different 
objectives, for instance, using the pressure from potential private competitors to contain costs in 
public firms, and using the more flexible management practices of private firms to adjust to non-
contractual events or unforeseen needs. At the same time, the partial maintenance of public 
delivery provides guarantees for failsafe delivery and, also, prevents monopolization by private 
firms. Therefore, future research needs to devote more attention to analyzing in greater depth the 
characteristics and effects of mixed and hybrid delivery choices.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Total-cost parameter estimates with time invariant inefficiency term (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
Without transaction costs With transaction costs 
    
?? 
0.62*** 
(0.0887) 
0.576*** 
(0.0789) 
0.596*** 
(0.0794) 
0.483*** 
(0.0914) 
0.526*** 
(0.0793) 
0.513*** 
(0.0803) 
?? 
0.554 
(0.3734) 
0.768** 
(0.3161) 
-0.622 
(0.3274) 
-0.032 
(0.3072) 
-0.012 
(0.3106) 
0.076 (0.324) 
??? 
-0.874** 
(0.4293) 
-0.854** 
(0.379) 
-0.682** 
(0.37) 
-0.962** 
(0.4206) 
-0.786* 
(0.422) 
-0.718* 
(0.4029) 
??? 
0.701** 
(0.3311) 
0.567* 
(0.311) 
0.505** 
(0.3191) 
0.552* 
(0.3199) 
0.535** 
(0.3139) 
0.551* 
(0.3108) 
??? 
-0.439*** 
(0.1083) 
-0.436*** 
(0.0972) 
-0.428*** 
(0.1006) 
-0.425*** 
(0.1018) 
-0.423*** 
(0.087) 
-0.459*** 
(0.0878) 
Tender year  
0.027*** 
(0.0096) 
0.024** 
(0.01) 
 
0.014 
(0.0099) 
0.008 
(0.0103) 
Private  
0.062*** 
(0.0143) 
  
0.115*** 
(0.016) 
 
Tusgsal   
0.089** 
(0.0196) 
  
0.154*** 
(0.0196) 
Rosanbus   
0.07*** 
(0.0154) 
  
0.117*** 
(0.0153) 
Soler Sauret   
0.039** 
(0.0182) 
  
0.09*** 
(0.0183) 
????  
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.0084) 
 
-0.012 
(0.0102) 
-0.008 
(0.1035) 
????  
-0.01 
(0.0103) 
-0.003 
(0.0097) 
 
0.0 
(0.0094) 
0.002 
(0.0083) 
????  
0.021*** 
(0.0077) 
0.017** 
(0.0081) 
 
0.023*** 
(0.0079) 
0.014 
(0.0088) 
γ 0.968 0.992 0.94 0.857 0.388 0.872 
? 
0.038* 
(0.02) 
0.082*** 
(0.017) 
0.09*** 
(0.021) 
0.013** 
(0.01) 
0.138*** 
(0.033) 
0.168*** 
(0.051) 
Log likelihood 723.15 749.34 751.69 726.61 763.80 766.69 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 
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